Abstract. Göös et al. (ITCS, 2015) have recently introduced the notion of ZeroInformation Arthur-Merlin Protocols (ZAM). In this model, which can be viewed as a private version of the standard Arthur-Merlin communication complexity game, Alice and Bob are holding a pair of inputs x and y, respectively, and Merlin, the prover, attempts to convince them that some public function f evaluates to 1 on (x, y). In addition to standard completeness and soundness, Göös et al., require a "zero-knowledge" property which asserts that on each yes-input, the distribution of Merlin's proof leaks no information about the inputs (x, y) to an external observer. In this paper, we relate this new notion to the well-studied model of Private Simultaneous Messages (PSM) that was originally suggested by Feige et al. (STOC, 1994). Roughly speaking, we show that the randomness complexity of ZAM corresponds to the communication complexity of PSM and that the communication complexity of ZAM corresponds to the randomness complexity of PSM. This relation works in both directions where different variants of PSM are being used. As a secondary contribution, we reveal new connections between different variants of PSM protocols which we believe to be of independent interest. Our results give rise to better ZAM protocols based on existing PSM protocols, and to better protocols for conditional disclosure of secrets (a variant of PSM) from existing ZAMs.
Introduction
In this paper we reveal an intimate connection between two seemingly unrelated models for non-interactive information-theoretic secure computation. We begin with some background. How does the ZAM model relate to other more standard models of information-theoretic secure computation?
As we will later see, answering this question also allows us to make some (modest) progress in understanding the communication complexity of ZAM protocols.
Private Simultaneous Message Protocols
Another, much older, notion of information theoretically secure communication game was suggested by Feige et al. [10] . As in the previous model, there are three (computationally unbounded) parties: Alice, Bob, and a Referee. Here too, an input (x, y) to a public function f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} is split between Alice and Bob, which, in addition, share a common random string c. Alice (resp., Bob) should send to the referee a single message a (resp., b) such that the transcript (a, b) reveals f (x, y) but nothing else. That is, we require two properties: (Correctness) There exists a decoder algorithm Dec which recovers f (x, y) from (a, b) with high probability; and (Privacy) There exists a simulator Sim which, given the value f (x, y), samples the joint distribution of the transcript (a, b) up to some small deviation error. (See Sect. 4 for formal definitions.) Following [14] , we refer to such a protocol as a private simultaneous messages (PSM) protocol. A PSM protocol for f can be alternatively viewed as a special type of randomized encoding of f [1, 15] , where the output of f is encoded by the output of a randomized function F((x, y), c) such that F can be written as F((x, y), c) = (F 1 (x, c), F 2 (y, c)). This is referred to as a "2-decomposable" encoding in [17] . (See Remark 4.5.)
ZAM versus PSM
Our goal will be to relate ZAM protocols to PSM protocols. Since the latter object is well studied and strongly "connected" to other information-theoretic notions (cf. [7] ), such a connection will allow us to place the new ZAM in our well-explored world of information-theoretic cryptography.
Observe that ZAM and PSM share some syntactic similarities (illustrated in Fig. 1 ). In both cases, the input is shared between Alice and Bob and the third party holds no input. Furthermore, in both cases the communication pattern consists of a single message. On the other side, in ZAM the third party (Merlin) attempts to convince Alice and Bob that the joint input is mapped to 1, and so the communication goes from Merlin to Alice/Bob who generate the output (accept/reject). In contrast, in a PSM protocol, the messages are sent in the other direction: from Alice and Bob to the third party (the Referee) who ends up with the output. In addition, the privacy guarantee looks somewhat different. For ZAM, privacy is defined with respect to an external observer and only over 1-inputs, whereas soundness is defined with respect to the parties (Alice and Bob) who hold the input (x, y). (Indeed, an external observer cannot even tell whether the joint input (x, y) is a 0-input.) Accordingly, in the ZAM model, correctness and privacy are essentially two different concerns that involve different parties. In contrast, for PSM protocols privacy should hold with respect to the view of the receiver who should still be able to decode.
The picture becomes even more confusing when looking at existing constructions. On one hand, the general ZAM constructions presented by Göös et al. [13, Theorem 6] (which use a reduction to Disjointness) seem more elementary than the simplest PSM protocols of [10] . On the other hand, there are ZAM constructions which share common ingredients with existing PSM protocols. Concretely, the branching program (BP) representation of the underlying function have been used both in the context of PSM [10, 14] and in the context of ZAM [13, Theorem 1] . (It should be mentioned that there is a quadratic gap between the complexities of the two constructions.) Finally, both in ZAM and in PSM, it is known that any function f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} admits a protocol with exponential complexity, but the best known lower-bound is only linear in n. Overall, it is not clear whether these relations are coincidental or point to a deeper connection between the two models. 1 
Our Results
We prove that ZAM protocols and PSM protocols are intimately related. Roughly speaking, we will show that the inverse of ZAM is PSM and vice versa. Therefore, the randomness complexity of ZAM essentially corresponds to the communication complexity of PSM and the communication complexity of ZAM essentially corresponds to the randomness complexity of PSM. This relation works in both directions where different variants of PSM are being used. We exploit this relation to obtain (modest) improvements in the complexity of ZAM and the complexity of some variants of PSM (e.g., Conditional Disclosure of Secrets). We proceed with a formal statement of our results. See Fig. 2 for an overview of our transformations.
From Perfect PSM to ZAM
We begin by showing that a special form of perfect PSM protocols (referred to pPSM) yields ZAM protocols. 1 The authors of [13] seem to suggest that there is no a-priori obvious connection between the two models. A pPSM protocol is a PSM in which both correctness and privacy are required to be errorless (perfect), and, in addition, the encoding should satisfy some regularity properties. 2 To prove the theorem, we use the combinatorial properties of the perfect encoding to define a new function g(x, y, p) = (g 1 (x, p), g 2 (y, p)) which, when restricted to a 1-input (x, y), forms a bijection from the randomness space to the output space, and when (x, y) is a 0-input the restricted function g(x, y, ·) covers only half of the range. Given such a function, it is not hard to design a ZAM: Alice (resp., Bob) samples a random point r A in the range of g 1 (resp., r B in the range of g 2 ) and accepts a proof p if p is a preimage of r A under g 1 (resp. p is a preimage of r B under g 2 ). It is not hard to verify that the protocol satisfies unambiguous completeness, 1/2-soundness and zero-information. (See Sect. 5.)
Although the notion of pPSM looks strong, we note that all known general PSM protocols are perfect. (See Appendices A and B.) By plugging in the best known protocol from [7] , we derive the following corollary. Corollary 2.2. Every function f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} has a ZAM with communication complexity and randomness complexity of O(2 n/2 ).
Previously, the best known upper bound for the ZAM complexity of a general function f was O(2 n ) [13] . Using known constructions of BP-based pPSM, we can also re-prove the fact that ZAM complexity is at most polynomial in the size of the BP that computes f . (Though, our polynomial is worse than the one achieved by Göös et al. [13] .)
From ZAM to One-Sided PSM
We move on to study the converse relation. Namely, whether ZAM can be used to derive PSM. For this, we consider a relexation of PSM in which privacy should hold only with 2 Essentially, the range of F = (F 1 , F 2 ) can be partitioned into two equal sets S 0 and S 1 and for every input (x, y) the function F x,y (c) that maps the randomness c to the transcript (a, b) forms a bijection from the randomness space to the set S f (x) . In the context of randomized encoding, this notion was originally referred to as perfect randomized encoding [1] . See Sect. 4 for formal definitions.
respect to 1-inputs. In the randomized encoding literature, this notion is referred to as semi-private randomized encoding [1, 3] . In the context of PSM protocols we refer to this variant as 1PSM. In particular, if the underlying ZAM protocol has a constant error (e.g., δ = 1/2), we can get a 1PSM with an exponential small error of exp(− (n)) at the expense of a linear overhead in the complexity, i.e., communication complexity and randomness complexity of O(nm) and O( n), respectively.
Both parts of the theorem are proven by "inverting" the ZAM scheme. That is, as a common randomness Alice and Bob will take a proof p sampled according to the ZAM's accepting distribution. Since each proof forms a rectangle, Alice and Bob can locally sample a random point (r A , r B ) from p's rectangle (Alice samples r A and Bob samples r B ). The 1PSM's encoding functions output the sampled point (r A , r B ). We show that if (x, y) is a 1-input then (r A , r B ) is distributed uniformly, while in the case of the 0-input the sampled point belongs to some specific set Z that covers only a small fraction of the point space. Therefore, the 1PSM's decoder outputs 0 if the sampled point is in Z and 1, otherwise.
The difference between the two parts of Theorem 2.3 lies in the way that the common randomness is sampled. In the first part we sample p according to the exact ZAM's accepting distribution, whereas in the second part we compromise on imperfect sampling. This allows us to reduce the length of the shared randomness in 1PSM at the expense of introducing the sampling error in privacy and correctness. The proof of the theorem appears in Sect. 6.
From 1PSM to PSM
Theorem 2.3 shows that a ZAM protocol with low randomness complexity implies communication-efficient 1PSM protocol. However, the latter object is not well studied and one may suspect that, for one-sided privacy, such low-communication 1PSM protocols may be easily achievable. The following theorem shows that this is unlikely by relating the worst-case communication complexity of 1PSM to the worst-case communication complexity of general PSM (here "worst case" ranges over all functions of given input length.) Theorem 2.4. Assume that for all n, each function f : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} has a δ(n)-correct ε(n)-private 1PSM protocol with communication complexity t (n) and randomness complexity s(n). Then, each f has a [δ(n)+δ(t (n))]-correct max(ε(n), δ(n)+ ε(t (n)))-private PSM protocol with communication complexity t (t (n)) and randomness complexity s(n) + s(t (n)). In particular, if every such f has a 1PSM with poly(n) communication and randomness, and negligible privacy and correctness errors of n −ω (1) , then every f has a PSM with poly(n) communication and randomness, and negligible privacy and correctness errors of n −ω (1) .
An important open question in information-theoretic cryptography is whether every function f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} admits a PSM whose communication and randomness complexity are polynomial in n and its privacy and correctness errors are negligible in n. Therefore, by Theorem 2.4, constructing 1PSM with such parameters would be considered to be a major breakthrough. Together with Theorem 2.3, we conclude that it will be highly non-trivial to discover randomness-efficient ZAM protocols for general functions.
Constructing CDS
In the CDS model [11] , Alice holds an input x and Bob holds an input y, and, in addition, both parties hold a common secret bit b. The referee, Carol, holds both x and y, but it does not know the secret b. Similarly to the PSM case, Alice and Bob use shared randomness to compute the messages m 1 and m 2 that are sent to Carol. The CDS requires that Carol can recover b from (m 1 , m 2 ) iff f (x, y) = 1. Moving to the complement f = 1 − f of f , one can view the CDS model as a variant of 1PSM, in which the privacy leakage in case of 0-inputs is full, i.e., given the messages sent by Alice and Bob, one can recover their secret b but on 1-input b remains secret. (Note that x and y are assumed to be public in both cases.) Indeed, it is not hard to prove the following observation. Clearly, one can combine the above theorem with the ZAM to 1PSM transformation and get a transformation from ZAM to CDS. However, one can do better by using a direct construction that avoids the overhead in the ZAM to 1PSM transformation of Theorem 2.3. The communication complexity of CDS protocols was studied in several previous works. Recently, it was shown by Ishai and Wee [18] that the CDS complexity of f is linear in the size of the arithmetic branching program (ABP). (This improves the previous quadratic upper-bound of [11] .) We can reprove this result by combining Theorem 2.6 with the ZAM construction of [13] whose complexity is also linear in the ABP size of f . Interestingly, the resulting CDS protocol is different from the construction of Ishai and Wee [18] , and can be extended to work with dependency programs (DP). The latter model was introduced in [22] The theorem extends to the case where the secret is a field element (see Theorem 8.2) and to the case where f is computed by an arithmetic dependency program and so its inputs are also field elements (see Remark 8.4) . To the best of our knowledge, Theorem 2.7 yields the first CDS whose complexity is linear in the dependency program of the underlying function. This is incomparable to the best previous result, implicit in [18, Section 7] , which achieves linear dependency in the size of the arithmetic span program (ASP) [21] that computes f . 3 Indeed, it is known that the size of the smallest dependency program of a function is polynomially related to the size of its smallest span program, but the transformation from one model to the other may incur some polynomial overhead [6] . Hence, for some functions, Theorem 2.7 can potentially lead to polynomial improvement over the ASP-(and ABP-) based schemes. On the other hand, the construction of [18] achieves perfect correctness, while our construction suffers from a nonzero decoding error. 4 We further mention that our construction can be viewed as dual to the construction of [18] ; See Remark 8.5. Finally, we note that CDS protocols have recently found applications in attribute-based encryption (see [12] ). For this application, the CDS is required to satisfy some linearity properties which hold for our CDS-based construction. (See Remark 8.3.)
Preliminaries
For an integer n ∈ N, let [n] = {1, . . . , n}. The complement of a bit b is denoted by b = 1 − b. For a set S, we let S k be the set of all possible k-tuples with entries in S, and for a distribution D, we let D k be the probability distribution over k-tuples such that each tuple's element is drawn according to D. We let s R ← S denote an element that is sampled uniformly at random from the finite set S. The uniform distribution over n-bit strings is denoted by U n . For a boolean function f : S → {0, 1}, we say that x ∈ S is 3 Arithmetic span programs [21] can emulate ABPs with constant overhead, while the converse is known only with polynomial overhead [6] . Hence, the ASP-based CDS subsume, in terms of complexity, the abovementioned ABP-based construction. 4 Moreover, the ABP-based construction of [18] applies not only to CDS, but also to a more general notion of partial garbling schemes which can be viewed as an intermediate notion between CDS and PSM.
We will also use statistical distance for probability distributions, where for a probability distribution D the value
We write 
Lemma 3.1. For any distribution Z = w i D i and probability distribution S, it holds that
Proof. By the definition of statistical distance we can write (S; Z ) as
Definitions

PSM-Based Models
Definition 4.1. (PSM) Let f : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} be a boolean function. We say that a pair of (possibly randomized 5 ) encoding algorithms c) ) that corresponds to the joint computation of F 1 and F 2 on a common c, satisfy the following properties:
δ-Correctness: There exists a deterministic algorithm Dec, called decoder, such that for every input (x, y) we have that
ε-Privacy: There exists a randomized algorithm (simulator) Sim such that for any input (x, y) it holds that
The communication complexity of the PSM protocol is defined as the encoding length t, and the randomness complexity of the protocol is defined as the length s of the common randomness.
One can also consider relaxations of this definition that are private only on a subset of inputs. We study such a relaxation 1PSM [1, 3] that is required to be private only on 1-inputs:
ε-Privacy on 1-inputs: There exists a simulator Sim such that for any 1-input
A stronger variant of PSM is captured by the notion of perfect PSM [1] .
Balance: There exists a 0-private (perfectly private) simulator Sim such that We consider a variant of CDS called conditional disclosure of the common secret [11] . As in PSM, Alice and Bob hold the inputs x and y, respectively, and, in addition, both parties get a secret b ∈ {0, 1}. The goal is to reveal the secret to an external referee Carol only if some predicate f (x, y) evaluates to 1. Unlike the PSM model, we assume that Carol knows both x and y. Formally, a CDS scheme is defined below.
Definition 4.4. (CDS)
Let f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} be a predicate. Let F 1 , F 2 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} × {0, 1} s → {0, 1} t be (possibly randomized) encoding algorithms. Then, the pair (F 1 , F 2 ) is a CDS scheme for f if and only if the function F(x, y, b, c) = (F 1 (x, b, c), F 2 (y, b, c) ) that corresponds to the joint computation of F 1 and F 2 on a common b and c, satisfies the following properties: δ-Correctness: There exists a deterministic algorithm Dec, called a decoder, such that for every 1-input (x, y) of f and any secret b ∈ {0, 1} we have that
ε-Privacy: There exists a simulator Sim such that for every 0-input (x, y) of f and any secret b ∈ {0, 1} it holds that
Similarly to PSM, the communication complexity of the CDS protocol is t and its randomness complexity is s.
The above definition naturally extends to the case where the secret comes from some non-binary domain B, and where the domain of the randomness and of the output of F 1 and F 2 is taken to be some arbitrary finite set. (When the output domain Z 1 of F 1 and Z 2 of F 2 differ, we define the communication complexity to be max i log |Z i |.)
Remark 4.5. (CDS and PSM as Randomized Encoding)
We can view PSM and CDS protocols under the framework of randomized encodings of functions (RE) [1, 15] 
(1) and (2) from Definition 4.1. Under this terminology, PSM is simply an encoding F(x, y, c) which can be decomposed into two parts, F 1 which depends on x and c but not on y and F 2 which depends on y and c but not on x. Similarly, the notion of pPSM and 1PSM can be derived by considering 2-decomposable perfect encodings and 2-decomposable encoding with 1-sided privacy. We further mention that a CDS can be also viewed as a randomized encoding. Indeed, ( Unambiguous Completeness: For any 1-input (x, y) and any randomness (r A , r B ) ∈ {0, 1} m × {0, 1} m there exists a unique p ∈ {0, 1} such that Accept(x, y, r A , r B , p) = 1. Zero-Information: There exists a distribution D on the proof space {0, 1} such that for any 1-input (x, y) we have that
The distribution D is called the accepting distribution. δ-Soundness:
The communication complexity (resp., randomness complexity) of the ZAM protocol is defined as the length of the proof (resp., the length m of the local randomness).
The Zero-Information property asserts that for every accepting input (x, y) the distribution D x,y , obtained by sampling r A and r B and outputting the (unique) proof p which is accepted by Alice and Bob, is identical to a single universal distribution D.
Following [13] , we sometimes refer to the proofs as "rectangles" because for each (x, y) a proof p naturally corresponds to a set of points
which forms a rectangle in {0, 1} m × {0, 1} m .
From pPSM to ZAM
In this section we construct a ZAM scheme from a pPSM protocol. By exploiting the combinatorial structure of pPSM, for each input (x, y) we construct a function h xy that is a bijection if (x, y) is a 1-input and is two-to-one if (x, y) is a 0-input. In the constructed ZAM scheme Alice and Bob use their local randomness to sample a uniform point in h's range (Alice samples its x-coordinate r A and Bob samples its y-coordinate r B ). Merlin's proof is the preimage p for the sampled point, i.e., a point p such that h xy ( p) = (r A , r B ) . (r A , r B ) .
First, the constructed ZAM is unambiguously complete because h xy is a bijection if (x, y) is a 1-input of f . Second, the constructed ZAM satisfies the Zero-Information property because the distribution of the accepted proofs is uniform. Third, the constructed ZAM is sound, because if (x, y) is a 0-input, then h xy is two-to-one, implying that with probability at least 1/2 no preimage exists. Theorem 2.1. Let f be a function with a pPSM protocol that has communication complexity t and randomness complexity s. Then f has a 1/2-sound ZAM scheme with randomness complexity of t and communication complexity of s + 1.
The function h satisfies the following useful properties as follows from the combinatorial view of pPSM (Remark 4.3). We now describe a ZAM protocol for f in which the local randomness of Alice and Bob is sampled from {0, 1} t , and the proof space is {0, 1} s × {0, 1}. Recall that (F 1 , F 2 ) is a pPSM and therefore s +1 = 2t and {0, 1} s ×{0, 1} = {0, 1} 2t . The ZAM's accepting functions A, B are defined as follows: Observe that the following equivalence holds. m 2 , (c, b) ) . 
Now we verify that (A,
1/2-Soundness: Fix some 0-input (x, y), and recall that the image H of h xy covers exactly half of the range {0, 1} t ×{0, 1} t , i.e., |H | = {0, 1} t × {0, 1} t /2. It follows that, with probability 1/2, the randomness of Alice and Bob (m 1 , m 2 ) chosen randomly from {0, 1} t × {0, 1} t lands outside H . In this case, the set h −1 xy (m 1 , m 2 ) is empty and so there is no proof (c, b) that will be accepted.
From ZAM to 1PSM
In this section we construct 1PSM protocols from a ZAM scheme and prove Theorem 2.3 (restated here for convenience). Proof. Let f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} be a function with a δ-sound ZAM protocol (A, B) with Alice's and Bob's local randomness spaces {0, 1} m and the proof space {0, 1} . Fix some integer k. We start by constructing the first 1PSM protocol.
We first define some additional notation and prove auxiliary claims. For a pair of inputs (x, y) let
Proof. By the soundness property of ZAM, we have that |E xy | ≤ δ2 2m for any 0-input (x, y). Hence, each |E k xy | ≤ (δ2 2m ) k . We conclude that
Let 
Claim 6.2. Let D acc be the accepting distribution of ZAM. Then, for any 1-input (x, y) and p ∈ {0, 1} we have that D acc
( p) = 2 −2m |A x p ||B y p |.
Proof. By definition
In order to derive the claim, note that since every proof forms a "rectangle" (see Sect. 4.2), we have that
We can now describe the encoding algorithms G 1 and G 2 and the decoder Dec. First, G 1 and G 2 use the shared randomness to sample a proof p according to the accepting distribution. Then G 1 and G 2 sample (private) randomness that can lead to the acceptance of p on their input (x, y), i.e., a, b) is sampled from the set Z . The task of the decoder is to verify whether it is likely that a point has been sampled from Z or uniformly. This is achieved by repeating the protocol k times. Below is the formal description of the algorithms G 1 , G 2 , and decoder.
-(Shared Randomness) The common randomness c ∈ {0, 1} k·2m is used for sampling k independent samples ( p 1 encoder G 1 (x, c) outputs (a 1 , . . . , a k ((a 1 , . . . , a k ), (b 1 , . . . , b k )) outputs 0 if ((a 1 , b 1 ), ..., (a k , b k ) ) ∈ Z ; otherwise, it outputs 1.
Let us verify that the proposed protocol is a 1PSM for f .
Since that the decoder never errs on 0-inputs, it suffices to analyze the probability that some 1-input (x, y) is incorrectly decoded to 0. Fix some 1-input (x, y). Below we will show that the message s = ((a 1 , b 1 ), . . . , (a k , b k ) ) generated by the encoders G 1 and G 2 is uniformly distributed over the set ({0, 1} m ×{0, 1} m ) k . Hence, the probability that s lands in Z (and decoded incorrectly to 0) is exactly
which, by Claim 6.1, is upper-bounded by 2 2n δ k .
It is left to show that s is uniformly distributed. To see this, consider the marginalization of (a i , b i )'s probability distribution: For a fixed (r A , r B ) we have that 
We have that Pr 
As a result, we introduce an additional error of 2 −t in both privacy and correctness. By setting t to k, we derive the second 1PSM protocol.
From 1PSM to PSM
In this section we show how to upgrade a 1PSM protocol into a PSM protocol. We assume that we have a way of constructing 1PSM for all functions. Our main idea is to reduce a construction of a PSM scheme for f to two 1PSM schemes. The first 1PSM scheme computes the function f , and the second 1PSM scheme computes the function Dec f , i.e., the complement of the decoder Dec f of the first scheme. We show how to combine the two schemes such that the first scheme protects the privacy of 1-inputs and the second scheme protects the privacy of 0-inputs. Theorem 2.4. Assume that for all n, each function f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1}
has a δ(n)-correct ε(n)-private 1PSM protocol with communication complexity t (n) and randomness complexity s(n). Then, each f has a [δ(n) + δ(t (n))]-correct max(ε(n), δ(n) + ε(t (n)))-private PSM protocol with communication complexity t (t (n)) and randomness complexity s(n) + s(t (n)). In particular, if every such f has a
1PSM with poly(n) communication and randomness, and negligible privacy and correctness errors of n −ω (1) , then every f has a PSM with poly(n) communication and randomness, and negligible privacy and correctness errors of n −ω (1) .
be a δ(n)-correct and ε(n)-private on 1 inputs 1PSM for f with decoder Dec f and simulator Sim f . Define a function g : {0,
t (n)) be a δ(t (n))-correct and ε(t (n))-
private on 1 inputs 1PSM for g with decoder Dec g and simulator Sim g .
We construct a (standard) PSM for f as follows. Let {0, 1} u = {0, 1} s(n) ×{0, 1} s(t (n)) be the space of shared randomness, let {0, 1} v = {0, 1} t (t (n)) be the output space and define the encoding functions H 1 , H 2 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} u → {0, 1} v , by (F 1 (x, c), r ) and H 2 (y, (c, r ) (F 2 (y, c) , r ).
We show that (H 1 , H 2 ) is a PSM by verifying its security properties.
δ(n) + δ(t (n))-Correctness:
On an input (e 1 , e 2 ) define the decoding algorithm Dec to output 1 − Dec g (e 1 , e 2 ). The decoding algorithm Dec works correctly whenever both Dec g and Dec f succeed. Hence, the error probability for decoding can be bounded as follows: (H 1 (x, (c, r )), H 2 (y, (c, r ) 
ε-Privacy: We define the simulator Sim as follows: on 0-inputs it outputs Sim g and on 1-inputs it computes Sim f = (m 1 , m 2 ), randomly samples r from {0, 1} s(t (n)) , and outputs (G 1 (m 1 , r ) , G 2 (m 2 , r )). We verify that the simulator truthfully simulates the randomized encoding (H 1 , H 2 ) with deviation error of at most ε.
We begin with the case where (x, y) is a 0-input for f . For any c, let L c denote the distribution of the random variable (G 1 (F 1 (x, c) , r ), G 2 (F 2 (y, c) , r )) where r R ← {0, 1} s(t (n)) . Let M denote the "mixture distribution" which is defined by first sampling c R ← {0, 1} s(n) and then outputting a random sample from L c , that is, the distribution
The set C satisfies the following two properties:
The property (1) holds because G 1 , G 2 is private on 1-inputs of g. The property (2) holds because Dec f decodes correctly with the probability at least 1 − δ(n). After splitting the mixture sum in two, we have that
Because of the properties of C, we have that the first sum is upperbounded by ε(t (n)) and the second one is upperbounded by δ(n). This implies that (Sim g ; M)≤δ(n)+ε(t (n)).
We move on to the case where (x, y) is a 1-input. Then
Consider the randomized procedure G which, given (m 1 , m 2 ), samples r R ← {0, 1} s(t (n)) and outputs the pair (G 1 (m 1 , r ), G 2 (m 2 , r ) ). Applying G to the above distributions we get:
Recall that, for a random r R ← {0, 1} s(t (n) , it holds that G(Sim f ; r ) ≡ Sim (1), and for every r , G (F 1 (x, c), F 2 (y, c) ; r ) = (H 1 (x, (c, r )), H 2 (y, (c, r )) ). Hence, Eq. 4 can be written as (Sim(1) ; (H 1 (x, (c, r )), H 2 (y, (c, r ) 
Since ε(n) ≤ max(ε(n), δ(n) + ε(t (n))), the theorem follows.
Constructing CDS Schemes
From 1PSM to CDS
In this section we construct a CDS scheme from a 1PSM protocol. Our construction is based on the observation (due to [11] ) that constructing a CDS scheme for a function f can be reduced to constructing a PSM scheme for the sharing function f ((x, s), (y, s)) = f (x, y) ∧ s. We show that one can strengthen this statement by substituting PSM with a weaker security primitive 1PSM. Proof. Let f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1}. Let F 1 , F 2 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} s → {0, 1} t be a δ-correct and ε-private on 1-inputs 1PSM for f with decoder Dec f and simulator
We construct a CDS scheme (H 1 , H 2 ) for g as follows. Let (x 0 , y 0 ) be some fixed 0-input of g. We define H 1 (x, b, c) to output F 1 (x 0 , c) (m 1 , m 2 ) . We define the simulator Sim to run the simulator Sim g .
We prove that the pair (H 1 , H 2 ) is a CDS scheme for g. δ-Correctness: Take any 1-input (x, y) of g:
By the correctness property of 1PSM, we have that F 2 (y, c) . By the correctness property of 1PSM, we have that
except with probability δ.
ε-Privacy: Fix some 0-input (x, y) of g. Then, by the 1-sided privacy of the 1PSM, we have that, for b = 0,
and, for b = 1,
From ZAM to CDS
We now describe a direct construction of CDS from ZAM that avoids the overhead in the transformation from ZAM to 1PSM (Theorem 2.3). The saving is mainly due to the fact that, unlike the 1PSM setting, in the CDS setting the decoder is allowed to depend on the inputs (x, y). Theorem 2.6. Assume that the function f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} has a δ-sound ZAM protocol with communication complexity and randomness complexity m. Then the following hold.
1.
The function f = 1 − f has a δ-correct and 0-private CDSwith communication complexity m and randomness complexity 2m.
For any t ∈ N, the function f has a (δ + 2 −t )-correct and (2 −t )-private CDSwith communication complexity m and randomness complexity ( + t).
Proof. Let f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} be a function with a δ-sound ZAM protocol (A, B) with randomness complexity of m and communication complexity of . Fix some integer k. We start by recalling some notation from Theorem 2.3. For a pair of inputs (x, y) let
We construct a CDS scheme (F 1 , F 2 ) for g as follows. As common randomness the scheme takes p sampled from the accepting distribution D acc of the ZAM scheme (as in Theorem 2.3, D acc can be perfectly simulated using 2m uniform bits). On an input (x, y, r 1 , r 2 ) the decoder outputs 0 if (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ E xy , and 1 otherwise. Now we prove that (F 1 , F 2 ) is a CDS scheme for f by verifying its security properties:
δ-Correctness: Take any 1-input (x, y) of f , which is a 0-input of f .
-If the secret bit b = 0, then r 1 and r 2 are sampled uniformly from A x p and B y p , respectively. This means that with probability 1 the pair (r 1 , r 2 ) lands in E xy and hence decoding of (x, y, r 1 , r 2 ) never fails in this case.
-If the secret bit b = 1, then r 1 and r 2 are sampled uniformly from {0, 1} m . This implies that the probability that (x, y, r 1 , r 2 ) is decoded incorrectly to 0 is the probability of (r 1 , r 2 ) landing in E xy . Due to the soundness property of ZAM, the latter probability is at most δ.
Perfect Privacy: We define the simulator Sim to output a random point (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} m × {0, 1} m . Take any 0-input (x, y) of f , which is a 1-input of f . We verify that Sim perfectly simulates the distribution of (F 1 , F 2 ) for any b ∈ {0, 1}. For b = 0 we have that F 1 and F 2 each output U m by construction. For b = 1 we use the observation from the proof of Theorem 2.3 that the joint distribution of (r 1 , r 2 )
The second protocol. Similarly to Theorem 2.3, the second protocol is identical to the first protocol except it uses an approximation of D acc . We know that for any t ∈ N the distribution D acc can be approximated using ( + t) bits at the cost of deviating by 2 −t in terms of the statistical distance from D acc . This introduces an additional error of 2 −t in both privacy and correctness of the second protocol.
CDS for Dependency Programs
A dependency program is a model of computation introduced in [22] . The original model captures functions over binary inputs. (M, ρ) , where M is a matrix over F and ρ is a labeling of the rows of M by the literals from {x 1 , . . . , x n , x 1 , . . . , x n } (every row is labeled with a single literal, and the same literal can be used in many rows). For an input u ∈ {0, 1} n let M u denote the matrix obtained from M by selecting only the rows assigned to the literals satisfied by u, i.e., a row labeled with x i (resp. x i ) is chosen if the i th bit of u is 1 (resp., 0). A dependency program accepts an input u if and only if the rows of M u are linearly dependent. A dependency program computes a Boolean function f if it accepts only 1-inputs of f . The size of the dependency program is the number of rows in M. We also write |M| to denote the number of row the matrix M has.
Definition 8.1. (DP) A dependency program over a field F is a pair
The number of columns s in DP is not counted toward its size. Without loss of generality we may assume that s is upper-bounded by the number of rows (the size) since the matrix M can be restricted to a maximal set of linearly independent columns without changing the function that is computed (cf. [6, Remark 2.4] ). It will also be convenient to assume that the number of rows labeled by x i is equal to the number of rows that are labeled by its complementx i . (If this is not the case and M x i contains less rows than Mx i then we can add new linearly independent rows labeled by x i , possibly at the expense of increasing the number of columns. Overall, the size of the resulting dependency program will be at most twice as large as the size of the original program.) Observe that if the input is partitioned between Alice and Bob, then the above convention guarantees that for every input x (resp., y) Alice (resp., Bob) will hold a matrix M x (resp., M y ) with a fixed number of rows which is independent of the input.
We construct CDS for dependency programs. The following theorem generalizes Theorem 2.7 from the introduction to arbitrary finite fields. Note that for large fields, the scheme achieves low decoding error even for small values of t (e.g., 1).
Proof. Let (M, ρ) be a dependency program for the function f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} over the finite field F. Let s denote the number of columns in M, and let m 1 (resp., m 2 ) denote the number of rows of M held by Alice for an input x (resp., held by Bob for an input y). Recall that, by convention, m 1 and m 2 are independent of x and y, and that m = m 1 + m 2 is at most m, the size of M.
We present a basic CDS scheme (F 1 , F 2 ) for f where the secret b can be an arbitrary field element. The scheme communicates at most 2m field elements, and uses at most 2m random field elements. It achieves perfect privacy and has a completeness error of 1/|F|. In fact, the decoder will either output the right answer or will output, with probability 1/|F|, a special failure symbol. Therefore, by repeating the protocol t times (with independent randomness), we can reduce the error to |F| −t with a multiplicative overhead of t in communication and randomness, as stated in the theorem.
The basic CDS scheme (F 1 , F 2 ) is defined as follows. As common randomness the scheme takes a pair of random vectors c ∈ 
, and otherwise it outputs a special failure symbol.
We prove that the pair (F 1 , F 2 ) is a CDS for f .
Correctness: Fix some 1-input (x, y) of f . Since v is in the left nullspace of M xy , it holds that
Therefore, decoding succeeds as long as (v T · d) = 0. The latter event happens with probability 1 − 1/|F| since d ∈ F m is uniformly distributed. Perfect Privacy: Fix some 0-input (x, y) of f . We show that in this case the random variables [12] if for any fixed 1-input (x, y) the decoding function Dec x,y which maps the messages of Alice and Bob (viewed together as a vector over a field F) to the secret b ∈ F is linear over F. It is not hard to verify that Theorem 2.7 yields a linear CDS. In fact, our scheme satisfies a stronger notion of linearity: for any fixed input (x, y) the functions F 1 and F 2 are degree 1 functions in the secret b and in the common randomness (c, d). These linearity properties are useful for some applications such as attribute-based encryption schemes (cf. [12, 18] ).
Remark 8.4. (Extension to non-binary inputs)
We can get CDS for functions whose inputs are field elements, i.e., f : M y c together with b + tc (i.e., the secret b is masked by the dot product of t and c). In a more compact form, the CDS can be written as
where b = (0 · · · 0b). It is not hard to show that this is a valid CDS. (Indeed, if t can be written as a linear combination of the rows of M, i.e., t = w M, then the referee can recover tc = w Mc and un-pad the secret; On the other hand, if t is not spanned by the rows of M then tc is uniformly distributed conditioned on Mc, and so the secret is perfectly hidden.) Getting back to dependency programs, recall that a DP is satisfied if the rows of M are linearly dependent (at the extreme no vector is spanned by the rows of M), which intuitively correspond to the converse of span programs. Indeed, the PSM for dependency programs can be written as
where c ∈ F s and d ∈ F m are shared random inputs. Comparing (5-6), we see that for span programs the secret is padded by a random image v of (an extended version of) M, whereas for dependency programs the secret is hidden as part of the preimage of v. In this sense, the two constructions are dual to each other.
• (u, v) 
Appendix 2: [7] is pPSM
In this section we describe the PSM protocol of [7] and prove that it forms a pPSM. To simplify the proof, our description slightly deviates from the original description though the resulting protocol is identical. where addition and multiplication are computed over the binary field. The following fact has been observed in [9] . inputs and u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 ) where u i ∈ {0, 1} N 1/2 as common randomness, and outputs the pair • S 0 ∩ S 1 = ∅ since each S b consists of (d, (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 )) 
